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a b s t r a c t
Unlike standard congestion games, weighted congestion games and congestion games
with player-specific delay functions do not necessarily possess pure Nash equilibria. It
is known, however, that there exist pure equilibria for both of these variants in the
case of singleton congestion games, i.e., if the players’ strategy spaces contain only sets
of cardinality one. In this paper, we investigate how far such a property on the players’
strategy spaces guaranteeing the existence of pure equilibria can be extended. We show
that both weighted and player-specific congestion games admit pure equilibria in the case
ofmatroid congestion games, i.e., if the strategy space of each player consists of the bases of
a matroid on the set of resources. We also show that the matroid property is the maximal
property that guarantees pure equilibria without taking into account how the strategy
spaces of different players are interweaved.
Additionally, our analysis of player-specific matroid congestion games yields a
polynomial time algorithm for computing pure equilibria. We also address questions
related to the convergence time of such games. For player-specific matroid congestion
games, in which the best response dynamics may cycle, we show that from every
state there exists a short sequences of better responses to an equilibrium. For weighted
matroid congestion games,we present a superpolynomial lower bound on the convergence
time of the best response dynamics showing that players do not even converge in
pseudopolynomial time.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Congestion games are a natural model for resource allocation in large networks like the Internet. It is assumed that
n players share a set R of m resources. Players are interested in subsets of resources. For example, the resources may
correspond to the edges of a graph, and each player may want to allocate a spanning tree of this graph. The delay (cost,
negative payoff) of a resource depends on the number of playerswho allocate the resource, and the delay of a set of allocated
resources corresponds to the sum of the delays of the resources in the set. A well known potential function argument of
Rosenthal [19] shows that congestion games always possess Nash equilibria,1 i.e., allocations of resources from which no
player wants to deviate unilaterally.
The existence of Nash equilibria gives a natural solution concept for congestion games. Unfortunately, this property
does not hold anymore if we slightly extend the class of considered games towards congestion games with player-specific
delay functions, i.e., games in which different players may have different delay functions, and weighted congestion games,
I This work was supported in part by the EU within the 6th Framework Programme under contract 001907 (DELIS) and by DFG grant Vo889/2-1. A
preliminary version appeared in the Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Internet & Network Economics (WINE 2006).∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: ackermann@cs.rwth-aachen.de (H. Ackermann), roeglin@cs.rwth-aachen.de (H. Röglin), voecking@cs.rwth-aachen.de (B. Vöcking).
1 In this paper, the term Nash equilibrium always refers to a pure equilibrium.
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i.e., games in which different players may have different impacts on the delays of the resources they allocate. For both of
these classes one can easily construct examples of games that do not possess Nash equilibria. In this paper, we study which
conditions on the strategy spaces of individual players guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria. We only consider games
with non-decreasing delay functions since otherwise one can construct examples of player-specific or weighted singleton
congestion games, i.e., games in which the players’ strategy spaces contain only sets of cardinality one, that do not possess
Nash equilibria.
It is known, however, that there exist Nash equilibria for both of these variants in the case of singleton congestion games
with non-decreasing delay functions [7,16]. We extend these results and show that both player-specific and weighted
congestion games admit pure equilibria in the case of matroid congestion games, i.e., if the strategy space of each player
consists of the bases of a matroid on the set of resources. We also show that the matroid property is the maximal condition
on the players’ strategy spaces that guarantees Nash equilibria without taking into account how the strategy spaces of
different players are interweaved. Our negative result shows that for every non-matroid set system there exist a weighted
and a player-specific congestion game in which the strategy space of each player is isomorphic to the given set system and
that does not possess a Nash equilibrium.
In the case of player-specific matroid congestion games, our analysis also yields a polynomial time algorithm for
computing pure equilibria. As the best response dynamics of such a game may cycle [16], we address the question whether
a Nash equilibrium can be found by players iteratively playing better or best responses. Again, we extend results from
player-specific singleton congestion games, and show that from every state of such a game there exists a polynomially long
sequence of better responses leading to an equilibrium.
For weighted matroid congestion games we do not have an efficient algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium, but
we show that players playing ‘‘lazy best responses’’ reach a Nash equilibrium after a finite number of steps, where a best
response is lazy if it exchanges the least number of resources compared to the current strategy among all best responses.
We also address the convergence time to Nash equilibria in weighted matroid games, and present a superpolynomial lower
bound. That is, we present a family of games that possess superpolynomially long best response sequences. Similar results
have already been presented by Even-Dar et al. [5]. However, they use players with exponentially large weights, whereas
the weights in our construction are polynomially bounded. This implies that players do not converge to a Nash equilibrium
in pseudopolynomial time.
1.1. Related work
Milchtaich [16] considers player-specific singleton congestion games and shows that every such game possesses at
least one Nash equilibrium. His existence proof implicitly contains an efficient algorithm for computing an equilibrium.
Additionally, he shows that players iteratively playing best responses in such games do not necessarily reach a Nash
equilibrium, that is, the best response dynamics may cycle. However, he also shows that from every state of such a game
there exists a polynomially long sequence of best responses to aNash equilibrium.Ourwork generalizesMilchtaich’s analysis
from singleton congestion games towards matroid congestion games. Gairing et al. [10] consider the class of player-specific
singleton congestion games with linear delay functions without offsets and show that the best response dynamics of such
games do not cycle. Milchtaich [17] also observes that player-specific network congestion games do not possess Nash
equilibria in general. Ackermann and Skopalik [2] prove that the related decision problem is NP-complete.
Milchtaich [16] also addresses the existence of Nash equilibria in congestion games which are both player-specific and
weighted. In this case, a Nash equilibrium does not necessarily exist in singleton congestion games. However, Georgiou et
al. [11] and Garing et al. [10] conjecture that these games possess Nash equilibria in the case of linear player-specific delay
functions without offsets.
Fotakis et al. [7] consider a selfish routing game inwhich the players are weighted and their strategy spaces are singleton
sets. They show that in this game at least one Nash equilibrium always exists and that players iteratively playing best
responses converge to such an equilibrium. Our proof that every weighted matroid congestion game possesses at least
one Nash equilibrium reworks the proof in [7]. Even-Dar et al. [5] consider the same game with respect to the convergence
time. They distinguish between different types of players’ weights and different delay functions, and show that players do
not necessarily converge quickly in any of these scenarios.
Fotakis et al. [8] consider weighted network congestion games in which the strategy space of each player corresponds
to the set of all paths between possibly different sources and sinks in a network. They show that Nash equilibria do not
necessarily exist in these games. On the positive side, they show that every weighted network congestion game possesses a
Nash equilibrium if the delay of every resource equals its congestion. Dunkel and Schulz [4] show that it isNP-hard to decide
whether a givenweighted network congestion game possesses a Nash equilibrium.Milchtaich [17] considers player-specific
or weighted network congestion games and tries to characterize which networks possess pure Nash equilibria independent
of the number of players, and independent of any assumption on the (player-specific) delay functions except monotonicity.
It is interesting to relate the results about the existence of Nash equilibria in player-specific and weighted matroid
congestion games to our recent work on the convergence time of standard congestion games: In [1] we characterize the
class of congestion games that admit polynomial time convergence to a Nash equilibrium. Motivated by the fact that in
singleton congestion games players converge quickly [14], we show that if the strategy space of each player consists of
the bases of a matroid on the set of resources, then players iteratively playing best responses reach a Nash equilibrium in
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polynomial time. Furthermore, we show that the matroid property is the maximal condition on the players’ strategy spaces
for guaranteeing polynomial time convergence to a Nash equilibrium if one does not take into account how the players’
strategy spaces are interweaved.
1.2. Formal definition of congestion games
A congestion game Γ is a tuple (N ,R, (Σi)i∈N , (dr)r∈R) where N = {1, . . . , n} denotes the set of players, R =
{1, . . . ,m} the set of resources, Σi ⊆ 2R the strategy space of player i, and dr : N → N a delay function associated
with resource r . We call a congestion game symmetric if all players share the same set of strategies, otherwise we call it
asymmetric. We denote by S = (S1, . . . , Sn) the state of the game where player i plays strategy Si ∈ Σi. Furthermore, we
denote by S⊕ S ′i the state S ′ = (S1, . . . , Si−1, S ′i , Si+1, . . . , Sn), i.e., the state S except that player i plays strategy S ′i instead of
Si. For a state S, we define the congestion nr(S) on resource r by nr(S) = |{i | r ∈ Si}|, that is, nr(S) is the number of players
sharing resource r in state S. Players act selfishly and like to play a strategy Si ∈ Σi minimizing their individual delay. The
delay δi(S) of player i in state S is given by δi(S) = ∑r∈Si dr(nr(S)). Given a state S, we call a strategy S∗i a best response of
player i to S if, for all S ′i ∈ Σi, δi(S ⊕ S∗i ) ≤ δi(S ⊕ S ′i ). In the following, we use the term best response sequence to denote
a sequence of consecutive strategy changes in which each step is a best response which strictly decreases the delay of the
corresponding player. Furthermore, we call a state S a Nash equilibrium if no player can decrease her delay by changing her
strategy, i.e., for all i ∈ N and for all S ′i ∈ Σi, δi(S) ≤ δi(S⊕ S ′i ). Rosenthal [19] shows that every congestion game possesses
at least one Nash equilibrium by considering the potential function φ : Σ1×· · ·×Σn → Nwith φ(S) =∑r∈R∑nr (S)i=1 dr(i).
There are two well known extensions of congestion games, namely player-specific congestion games and weighted
congestion games. In a player-specific congestion game every player i has its own delay function dir : N → N for every
resource r ∈ R. Given a state S, the delay of player i is defined as δi(S) = ∑r∈Si dir(nr(S)). In a weighted congestion game
every player i ∈ N has a weight ωi ∈ N. Given a state S, we define the congestion on resource r by nr(S) =∑i:r∈Si ωi, that
is, nr(S) is the total weight of all players sharing resource r in state S.
1.3. Matroids and matroid congestion games
We now introduce matroid congestion games. Before we give a formal definition of such games we shortly introduce
matroids. For a detailed discussion, we refer the reader to [20].
Definition 1. A tupleM = (R, I) is a matroid ifR = {1, . . . ,m} is a finite set of resources and I is a non-empty family of
subsets ofR such that, if I ∈ I and J ⊆ I , then J ∈ I, and, if I, J ∈ I and |J| < |I|, then there exists an i ∈ I \ J with J ∪{i} ∈ I.
Let I ⊆ R. If I ∈ I, then we call I an independent set, otherwise we call it dependent. It is well known that all maximal
independent sets of I have the same cardinality. The rank rk(M) of the matroid M is the cardinality of the maximal
independent sets. A maximal independent set B is called a basis of M. If additionally a weight function w : R → N is
given,M is called a weighted matroid and one is usually interested in finding a basis of minimumweight, where the weight
of an independent set I is given byw(I) =∑r∈I w(r). It is well known that such a basis can be found by a greedy algorithm.
Now we are ready to define matroid congestion games.
Definition 2. We call a congestion game Γ = (N ,R, (Σi)i∈N , (dr)r∈R) amatroid congestion game if for every player i ∈ N ,
Mi := (R, Ii) with Ii = {I ⊆ S | S ∈ Σi} is a matroid and Σi is the set of bases of Mi. Additionally, we denote by
rk(Γ ) = maxi∈N rk(Mi) the rank of the matroid congestion game Γ .
The obvious application of matroid congestion games are network design problems in which players compete for the
edges of a graph in order to build a spanning tree [21]. There are also other interesting applications as even simple matroid
structures like uniformmatroids, that are rather uninteresting from an optimization point of view, lead to rich combinatorial
structureswhen various playerswith possibly different strategy spaces are involved. Illustrative examples based on uniform
matroids are market sharing games with uniform market costs [12] and scheduling games in which each player has to
injectively allocate a given set of tasks (services) to a given set of machines (servers).
Let us remark that, in the case ofmatroid congestion games, the assumption that all delays are positive is not a restriction.
Since all strategies have the same size, one can easily shift all delays by the same value in order to obtain positive delays
without changing the better and best response dynamics.
2. Player-specific matroid congestion games
In this section, we consider player-specific matroid congestion games with non-decreasing player-specific delay
functions and prove that every such game possesses at least one Nash equilibrium. The proof we present extends techniques
invented for singleton congestion games [16] towards matroid congestion games, and implicitly describes an efficient
algorithm to compute an equilibrium of such games.
It is known that the best response dynamics of a player-specific singleton congestion game may cycle, i.e., a sequence of
best responses starting in a state S may return to state S. Thus, player-specific singleton congestion games are no potential
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games. However, if the players play their best responses in a certain order, then they quickly find a Nash equilibrium, that is,
from every state of such a game, there exists a sequence of best responses of polynomial length to a Nash equilibrium [16].
Hence, if the players play best responses in a random order, then the expected number of best responses needed to reach a
Nash equilibrium is finite. In Section 2.2, we investigatewhether a similar property also holds formatroid congestion games.
We show that from every state of a player-specific matroid congestion game there exists a sequence of better responses of
polynomial length leading to a Nash equilibrium. We call such a sequence of better responses an improvement path, and we
leave it as an open question whether short sequences of best responses always exist for player-specific matroid congestion
games.
2.1. Existence of Nash equilibria
Theorem 3. Every player-specific matroid congestion gameΓ with non-decreasing delay functions possesses a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Recall that since the strategy space of player i corresponds to the set of bases of a matroidMi, all strategies of player
i have the same size rk(Mi). In the following, we represent a strategy of player i by rk(Mi) tokens that the player places
on the resources she allocates. Suppose that we reduce the number of tokens of some of the players, that is, player i has
ki ≤ rk(Mi) tokens that she places on the resources of an independent set of cardinality ki. Observe that the independent
sets of cardinality ki form the bases of a matroidM′i whose independent sets correspond to those independent sets ofMi
with cardinality at most ki. The matroidMi is also called the ki-truncation of the matroidMi. Hence, a game in which some
of the players have a reduced number of tokens is also a matroid congestion game.
We prove the theoremby induction on the total number of tokens τ =∑i∈N rk(Mi) that the players are allowed to place,
that is, we prove the existence of Nash equilibria for a sequence of games Γ0,Γ1, . . . ,Γτ , where Γ`+1 is obtained from Γ`
by giving one more token to one of the players. Γ0 is the game in which each player has only the empty strategy. Obviously,
Γ0 has only one state and this state is a Nash equilibrium.
As induction hypothesis assume that player i has placed ki ≥ 0 tokens, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and this placement corresponds to
a Nash equilibrium of the player-specific matroid congestion game Γ` = (N ,R, (Σkii )i∈N , (dir)i∈N ,r∈R) with ` =
∑
i∈N ki,
in which the set of strategiesΣkii coincides with the ki-truncation ofMi.
Now assume that some player i0 has to place an additional token t0. We show how to compute a Nash equilibrium for
the game Γ`+1 obtained from a Nash equilibrium of Γ` by changing i0’s strategy space to the set of independent sets of size
ki0 + 1. Since an optimal basis of a matroid can be computed by a greedy algorithm, there exists a resource r0 such that
placing the token t0 on r0 gives an independent set of size ki0 + 1 with minimum delay among all independent sets of the
same size. Thus, assuming that the tokens of the other players are fixed, an optimal strategy for player i0 is to place t0 on
r0 and leave all other tokens unchanged. However, as the congestion on r0 is increased by one, other players may want to
move their tokens from r0 in order to obtain a better independent set. We now use matroid properties to show that a Nash
equilibrium of Γ`+1 can be reached with at most n ·m · rk(Γ )moves of tokens.
Lemma 4. Let M = (R, I) be a matroid with weights w : R → N and let Bopt be a basis of M with minimum weight. If
the weight of a single resource ropt ∈ Bopt is increased such that Bopt is no longer of minimum weight, then, in order to obtain a
minimumweight basis again, it suffices to exchange ropt with a resource r∗ ∈ R of minimumweight such that Bopt ∪ {r∗} \ {ropt}
is a basis.
Proof. In order to prove the lemma we use the following property of a matroidM = (R, I). For a proof of this property,
we refer the reader to Lemma 39.12 from [20].
Proposition 5. (Schrijver [20]). LetM = (R, I) be a matroid, and let I, J ∈ I with |I| = |J| be independent sets. The bipartite
graph G(I∆J) = (V , E)with V = (I \ J)∪ (J \ I) and E = {{i, j} | i ∈ I \ J, j ∈ J \ I, I ∪{j} \ {i} ∈ I} contains a perfect matching.
Let B′opt be a minimum weight basis w. r. t. the increased weight of ropt. Let P be a perfect matching of the graph
G(Bopt∆B′opt) and denote by e the edge from P that contains ropt. For every edge {r, r ′} ∈ P \ {e}, it holds w(r) ≤ w(r ′)
as, otherwise, ifw(r) > w(r ′), the basis Bopt ∪ {r ′} \ {r}would have smaller weight than Bopt.
Now denote by r ′opt the resource that is matchedwith ropt, i.e., the resource such that e = {ropt, r ′opt} ∈ P . Asw(r) ≤ w(r ′)
for every {r, r ′} ∈ P \ {e}, the weight of Bopt \ {ropt} is bounded from above by the weight of B′opt \ {r ′opt}. By the definition of
the matching P , Bopt ∪ {r ′opt} \ {ropt} is a basis. By our arguments above, the weight of this basis is bounded from above by
the weight of B′opt. Hence, this basis is optimal w. r. t. the increased weight of ropt. 
After placing token t0 of player i0 on resource r0, resource r0 has one additional token in comparison to the initial Nash
equilibrium S` of the game Γ`. Since we assume non-decreasing delay functions, only the players with a token on r0 might
now have an incentive to change their strategies. Let i1 be one of these players. It follows from Lemma 4 that i1 has a best
response in which she moves a token t1 from resource r0 to another resource that we call r1. Now r1 is the only resource
with one additional token in comparison to S`. Suppose we have not yet reached a Nash equilibrium. Only those players
with a token on r1 might have an incentive to change their strategies. Again by applying Lemma 4, we can identify a player
i2 that has a best response in which she moves a token t2 from r1 to a resource r2, which then is the only resource with one
additional token.
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The token migration process described above can be continued in the same way until it reaches a Nash equilibrium of
the game Γ`+1. The correctness of the process is ensured by the following invariant.
Invariant 6. For every j ≥ 0, after player ij moves token tj onto resource rj,
(a) only players with a token on rj may violate the Nash equilibrium condition,
(b) the Nash equilibrium condition of all players would be satisfied if one ignores the additional token on rj, that is, if each player
calculates the delay on rj as if there were one token less on this resource.
The invariant follows by induction on j: For player ij the invariant is satisfied as this player plays a best response according
to Lemma 4. Thus she satisfies the Nash equilibrium condition even without virtually reducing the congestion on rj. For all
other players, the validity of the invariant for j follows directly from the validity of the invariant for j − 1 as these players
do not move their tokens.
Thus, in order to show the existence of a Nash equilibrium for Γ`+1, it suffices to show that the token migration process
is finite. Consider an arbitrary token t of player i. For a resource r , let Di(r) denote the delay of i on r if r has one more
token than in the initial state S. Whenever t is moved by the migration process from a resource r to a resource r ′, it must be
Di(r) > Di(r ′). Hence, the token t can visit each resource at most once during the token migration process. As there are at
most n · rk(Γ ) tokens, the migration process terminates after at most n ·m · rk(Γ ) steps in a Nash equilibrium of Γ`+1. 
Observe that the proof of Theorem 3 implicitly describes an efficient algorithm to compute a Nash equilibrium with at
most n2 ·m · rk2(Γ )moves of tokens.
Corollary 7. There exists a polynomial time algorithm to compute a Nash equilibrium of a player-specific matroid congestion
game with non-decreasing player-specific delay functions.
2.2. Existence of short improvement paths
Theorem 8. Let Γ be a player-specific matroid congestion game with non-decreasing delay functions, and let S be an arbitrary
state of Γ . Then there exists a better response sequence of length at most 2 · n2 ·m · rk2(Γ )which starts in state S and terminates
in a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The proof uses similar arguments as the proof of Theorem 3, except that initially every player places all her tokens.
After the first placement of the tokens, which corresponds to the given state S, we assume that all tokens are deactivated, i.e.,
players are not allowed to move them in order to decrease their delays. We then consider a sequence of games Γ0, . . . ,Γτ ,
where Γ`+1 is obtained from Γ` by activating one more token. We can achieve that deactivated tokens are not moved by
setting the delay of the corresponding player on the corresponding resource to 0. Then activating a token corresponds
to restoring the delay to its real value. Thus, each game Γ` is a player-specific matroid congestion game. Given a Nash
equilibrium S` of Γ`, we show that there exists a short improvement path in Γ`+1 from the former equilibrium S` to a Nash
equilibrium S`+1 of Γ`+1. Obviously, by concatenating all these paths we obtain an improvement path from S to a Nash
equilibrium of Γ .
As induction hypothesis assume that ` tokens have been activated so far and that we are given a Nash equilibrium S` of
Γ`. Suppose now, that an additional token t0 of player i0 is activated, and that i0moves t0 to a resource r1 in order to decrease
her delay. After that, we are in a situation similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 3, that is, the congestion on one resource
r1 is increased by one compared to the Nash equilibrium S` of Γ`. In contrast to the situation in the proof of Theorem 3, in
which the congestion of the other resources remained unchanged, there exists a resource r0 whose congestion is decreased
by one compared to the congestion in Γ`. Assume that we place a dummy token on resource r0 which artificially increases
the congestion by one. In this case, we can consider the same token migration process as in the proof of Theorem 3.
In contrast to the previous proof, there are two different ways how this process can terminate. If the process returns to
r0, i.e., if it moves a token onto r0, we terminate the process and remove the dummy token from r0. If the process does not
return to r0, then it is not affected by the dummy token and by the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3 it follows
that it terminates after at most n ·m · rk(Γ )moves of tokens.
In the first case, if at some time a player moves a token tj from a resource rj−1 to the resource rj = r0, then after removing
the dummy token from r0wehave reached aNash equilibriumofΓ`+1 due to Invariant 6. Since the resource r0 is not involved
in the previous moves of tokens, each of these movements reduces the delay of the corresponding player also in the game
Γ`+1 without the dummy token. In the last step a player moves a token onto r0 and improves her delay even if the dummy
token is present. Hence, she also decreases her delay in Γ`+1 without the dummy token.
In the second case, we have almost reached a Nash equilibrium. That is, all players were satisfied if wewould not remove
the dummy token. Suppose now that we remove the dummy token. As the delay functions are non-decreasing, only players
who can move tokens onto r0 may have an incentive to change their strategies. The following lemma, which is a slight
variation of Lemma 4, ensures that players who have an incentive to change their strategies with respect to the tokens they
are allowed to move only need to move a token onto r0 in order to obtain a best response.
Lemma 9. LetM = (R, I) be a matroid with weights w : R → N and let Bopt be a basis ofM with minimum weight. If the
weight of a single resource r∗ ∈ R \ Bopt is decreased such that Bopt is no longer of minimum weight, then, in order to obtain a
minimumweight basis again, it suffices to exchange r∗ with a resource ropt ∈ Bopt of maximumweight such that Bopt∪{r∗}\{ropt}
is a basis.
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The proof of Lemma 9 follows the same line of arguments as the proof of Lemma 4 and is therefore omitted. Suppose
now that player i′0 moves a token t
′
0 from resource r
′
1 to r0. Afterwards, the congestion on r0 equals the congestion in the
former equilibriumwith respect to the dummy token, and the congestion on r ′1 is decreased by one. Again only players who
can move a token onto r ′1 have an incentive to change their strategy. We can continue this process obtaining an additional
token migration process in which a token tj+1 moves to the resource from which token tj was removed. As before, we have
to show that this token migration process is finite and terminates in a Nash equilibrium of Γ`+1. The fact that it terminates
in a Nash equilibrium is ensured by the following invariant which is a slight variation of Invariant 6.
Invariant 10. For every j ≥ 0, after player i′j removes token t ′j from resource r ′j+1,
(a) only players who can move a token onto r ′j+1 may violate the Nash equilibrium condition,
(b) the Nash equilibrium condition of all players would be satisfied if one ignores the missing token on r ′j+1, that is, if each player
calculates the delay on r ′j+1 as if there were one additional token on this resource.
Invariant 10 can be proven analogously to Invariant 6. Its proof is therefore omitted. It remains to show that the second
tokenmigration process is also finite. Again, the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3 show that this is true, and we
conclude that the second process terminates after at most n ·m · rk(Γ )moves of tokens in a Nash equilibrium of Γ`+1.
Altogether, we have shown that there exists an improvement path of length 2 ·n ·m · rk(Γ ) from S` to a Nash equilibrium
of Γ`+1. As the number of tokens τ is upper bounded by n · rk(Γ ), the theorem follows. 
3. Weighted matroid congestion games
In this section we consider weighted matroid congestion games with non-decreasing delay functions and show that
every such game possesses a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we show that myopic players do not necessarily reach such an
equilibrium if they iteratively play arbitrary best responses. We show, however, that players who are only allowed to play
best responses that exchange the least number of resources compared to their current strategies eventually reach a Nash
equilibrium. We call such best responses lazy best responses and define them formally as follows.
Definition 11. Given a state S, we call a best response S∗i of player i lazy if it can be decomposed into a sequence of strategies
Si = S0i , S1i , . . . , Ski = S∗i with |S j+1i \ S ji | = 1 and δi(S ⊕ S j+1i ) < δi(S ⊕ S ji ), for 0 ≤ j < k.
From the following proposition one can easily conclude that whenever a player can decrease her delay, then there exists
a lazy best response for this player. For a proof we refer the reader to Lemma 39.12 in [20].
Proposition 12 (Schrijver [20]). Given a matroidM = (R, I) with weights w : R → N, a basis B ∈ I is a minimum weight
basis ofM if and only if there exists no basis B∗ ∈ I with |B \ B∗| = 1 andw(B∗) < w(B).
We are now ready to prove that weighted matroid congestion games possess Nash equilibria.
Theorem 13. Every weighted matroid congestion game Γ with non-decreasing delay functions possesses a Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, players reach an equilibrium after a finite number of lazy best responses.
Proof. Let S be a state of Γ . With each resource r , we associate a pair zr(S) = (dr(nr(S)), nr(S)) consisting of the delay
and the congestion of r in state S. For two resources r and r ′ and states S and S ′, let zr(S) ≥ zr ′(S ′) if and only if
dr(nr(S)) > dr ′(nr ′(S ′)) or dr(nr(S)) = dr ′(nr ′(S ′)) and nr(S) ≥ nr ′(S ′). Let zr(S) > zr ′(S ′) if and only if zr(S) ≥ zr ′(S ′)
and zr(S) 6= zr ′(S ′). Let z¯(S) denote a vector containing the pairs zr(S) of all resources r ∈ R in non-increasing order, that
is, z¯j(S) ≥ z¯j+1(S), where z¯j(S) denotes the jth component of z¯(S), for 1 ≤ j < |R|.
We denote by <lex the lexicographic order among the vectors z¯(S), i.e., z¯(S1) <lex z¯(S2) if there exists an index l such
that z¯k(S1) = z¯k(S2), for all k < l, and z¯l(S1) < z¯l(S2).
Due to Lemma 12, in every state S which is not a Nash equilibrium there exists at least one player i who can decrease
her delay by playing a lazy best response S∗i . Since S
∗
i is a lazy best response, there exists a sequence of strategies Si =
S0i , . . . , S
k
i = S∗i such that, for every 0 ≤ j < k, |S j+1i \ S ji | = 1 and
δi(S) = δi(S ⊕ S0i ) > δi(S ⊕ S1i ) > · · · > δi(S ⊕ Ski ) = δi(S ⊕ S∗i ).
We now claim that z¯(S⊕ S j+1i ) <lex z¯(S⊕ S ji ), for every 0 ≤ j < k. Let rj be the unique resource in S ji that is not contained
in S j+1i and let r
∗
j be the unique resource that is contained in S
j+1
i but not in S
j
i . Since the delay decreases strictly with the
exchange, we have
drj(nrj(S ⊕ S ji )) > dr∗j (nr∗j (S ⊕ S
j+1
i )).
Additionally, since we assume non-decreasing delay functions,
drj(nrj(S ⊕ S ji )) ≥ drj(nrj(S ⊕ S ji )− ωi) = drj(nrj(S ⊕ S j+1i )).
Furthermore, nrj(S ⊕ S ji ) > nrj(S ⊕ S j+1i ). Combining these inequalities implies zrj(S ⊕ S ji ) > zrj(S ⊕ S j+1i ) and zrj(S ⊕ S ji ) >
zr∗j (S ⊕ S
j+1
i ). This yields
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and hence z¯(S⊕ S ji ) >lex z¯(S⊕ S j+1i ). That is, the lexicographic order decreases with every exchange and, hence, with every
lazy best response. This concludes the proof of the theorem. 














The first term is an upper bound on the maximal number of different vectors z¯(S) and the second one bounds the number
of different states of the matroid congestion game Γ . Below we present an example showing that arbitrary best responses
do not necessarily lead to a Nash equilibrium. In singleton congestion games, every best response is a lazy best response.
Hence, in these games, players playing iteratively best responses always reach a Nash equilibrium. A lower bound on the
convergence time in this case is presented in Section 5.
Theorem 14. The best response dynamics of a weighted matroid congestion game with non-decreasing delay functions can cycle.
Proof. Consider a weighted matroid congestion game with four resources {1, 2, 3, 4} and two players with weightsω1 = 1
and ω2 = 2. We define the strategy spaces as follows:
Σ1 = {{1}, {3}} Σ2 = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 4}, {3, 4}}.
Observe that both strategy spaces are sets of bases of matroids on subsets of the resources. Additionally, we define non-
decreasing delay functions. A dash denotes a value we do not have to care about.
nr = 1 nr = 2 nr = 3
δ1(n1) 2 20 20
δ2(n2) - 9 -
δ3(n3) 4 8 10
δ4(n4) - 20 -
Now consider the following cycle of states:
({3}, {1, 3})→ ({3}, {2, 4})→ ({1}, {2, 4})→ ({1}, {1, 3})→ ({3}, {1, 3}).
Each strategy change induces a set of inequalities in order to be a best response. One can easily verify that all these
inequalities are satisfied by the above defined delay functions. Hence, players playing arbitrary best responses do not
necessarily converge to a Nash equilibrium in weighted matroid congestion games. 
The delay functions in the previous example are non-decreasing but not strictly increasing. We leave open the question
whether in arbitrary weighted matroid congestion games with strictly increasing delay functions players always converge
to an equilibrium.
4. Non-matroid strategy spaces
In the previous two sections,we showed that thematroid property is a sufficient condition on the combinatorial structure
of the players’ strategy spaces for guaranteeing the existence of Nash equilibria in player-specific or weighted congestion
gameswith non-decreasing delay functions. In this section,we show that thematroid property is also themaximal condition
for guaranteeing the existence of Nash equilibria in such games.
Our negative result shows that for every non-matroid set system there exist a weighted and a player-specific congestion
game in which the strategy space of each player is isomorphic to the given set system and that does not possess a Nash
equilibrium. Our construction assumes that the strategy spaces of different players can be interweaved appropriately. Let
us remark that the delay functions are positive and increasing.
If one drops this assumption and considers special classes of congestion games in which the delay functions and/or the
way of how the strategy spaces can be interweaved are restricted, then one can identify larger classes of weighted and
player-specific congestion games that possess Nash equilibria. For instance, Fotakis et al. [8] prove that every weighted
network congestion game possesses a Nash equilibrium if one additionally assumes that the delay on an edge equals the
current congestion on that edge. Often there exists a common combinatorial interpretation of the resources in a congestion
game; they can, for instance, be the edges of a graph and every player might want to allocate a path in that graph between
a given source/sink pair. This restricts the way in which the strategy spaces of different players can be interweaved. For
example, Milchtaich [17] shows that every player-specific or weighted network congestion game possesses an equilibrium
if the network graph belongs to a certain restricted class of graphs.
Observe that our negative results show that our positive results are tight. In Theorems 3 and 13 we show that every
player-specific or weighted congestion game possesses a Nash equilibrium if the strategy space of each player corresponds
to the bases of a matroid, regardless of how the strategy spaces of different players are interweaved and for every choice of
non-decreasing delay functions. Our negative results show that such a positive result cannot be extended further without
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placing additional assumptions on the delay functions and/or the relation of the strategy spaces. In addition to that, we also
demonstrate that the way in which the strategy spaces are interweaved in our construction is not too restrictive to apply to
natural classes of congestion games by showing that our construction can, for instance, easily be embedded into (symmetric)
network congestion games.
4.1. A characterization of non-matroid set systems
Let Σ be a set system on a set R of resources. The set system Σ is called an anti-chain if for every X ∈ Σ , no proper
superset Y ⊃ X belongs to Σ . Moreover, we call Σ a non-matroid set system if the tuple (R, {X ⊆ S | S ∈ Σ}) is not
a matroid. In [1] we show that every non-matroid anti-chain possesses the (1, 2)-exchange property. Here we need the
following variant of this property with positive (instead of non-negative) delays.
Definition 15 ((1, 2)-Exchange Property). LetΣ be an anti-chain on a set of resourcesR. We say thatΣ satisfies the (1, 2)-
exchange property if we can identify three distinct resources a, b, c ∈ R with the property that for every given k ∈ N with
k > |R|, we can choose a delay d(r) ∈ {1, k+ |R|} for every r ∈ R \ {a, b, c} such that for every choice of the delays of a,
b, and c with |R| ≤ d(a), d(b), d(c) ≤ k, the following property is satisfied: If d(a)+ |R| ≤ d(b)+ d(c), then for every set
S ∈ Σ with minimum delay, a ∈ S and b, c /∈ S. If d(a) ≥ d(b)+ d(c)+ |R|, then for every set S ∈ Σ with minimum delay,
a /∈ S and b, c ∈ S.
Lemma 16. Let Σ be an anti-chain on a set of resourcesR. Furthermore, let I = {X ⊆ S | S ∈ Σ}, and assume that (R, I) is
not a matroid, i.e.,Σ is not the set of bases of some matroid. ThenΣ possesses the (1, 2)-exchange property.
Before we prove Lemma 16, we present an additional property of matroids. For a proof of this property, we refer the
reader to Theorem 39.6 in [20].
Proposition 17 (Schrijver [20]). LetΣ be a set system on a finite setR. ThenΣ is the set of bases of a matroid if and only if for
every pair of sets S1, S2 ∈ Σ and every r2 ∈ S2 \ S1, there exists an r1 ∈ S1 \ S2 such that S2 ∪ {r1} \ {r2} ∈ Σ .
Proof (Lemma 16). Since (R, I) is not a matroid, there exist due to Proposition 17 two sets X, Y ∈ Σ and a resource
x ∈ X \ Y such that for every y ∈ Y \ X , the set X \ {x} ∪ {y} is not contained inΣ .
Let X and Y be such sets and let x ∈ X be such a resource. Consider all subsets Y ′ of the set X ∪ Y \ {x}with Y ′ ∈ Σ . Every
such set Y ′ can be written as Y ′ = X \ {x = x1, . . . , xl} ∪ {y1, . . . , yl′} with xi ∈ X \ Y and yi ∈ Y \ X and l+ l′ > 2. This is
true since l ≥ 1 holds per definition and l′ ≥ 1 holds becauseΣ is an anti-chain. Furthermore l and l′ cannot both equal 1 as
otherwise we obtain a contradiction to the choice of X, Y , and x. Among all these sets Y ′, let Ymin denote one set for which
l′ is minimal. Observe that we can replace Y by Ymin without changing the aforementioned properties of X , Y , and x. Hence,
in the following, we assume that Y = Ymin, that is, we assume that Y \ X = Y ′ \ X for all of the aforementioned sets Y ′.
We claim that we can always identify resources a, b, c ∈ X ∪ Y such that either a ∈ X \ Y and b, c ∈ Y \ X or a ∈ Y \ X
and b, c ∈ X \ Y with the property that for every Z ⊆ X ∪ Y with Z ∈ Σ , if a 6∈ Z , then b, c ∈ Z . In order to see this, we
distinguish between the cases l′ = 1 and l′ ≥ 2:
(1) Let Y \ X = {y1} and hence X \ Y = {x = x1, . . . , xl}with l ≥ 2. Then we set a = y1, b = x1, and c = x2. Consider a set
Z ⊆ X ∪ Y with Z ∈ Σ and a 6∈ Z . Then Z = X sinceΣ is an anti-chain, and hence b, c ∈ Z .
(2) Let Y \ X = {y1, . . . , yl′} with l′ ≥ 2. Then we set a = x, b = y1, and c = y2. Consider a set Z ⊆ X ∪ Y with Z ∈ Σ and
a 6∈ Z . Since we assumed that Y = Ymin, it must be b, c ∈ Z as otherwise Z \ X 6= Y \ X .
Now we define delays for the resources inR \ {a, b, c} such that the properties in Definition 15 are satisfied. Let k ∈ N
be chosen as in Definition 15, that is, d(a), d(b), d(c) ∈ {|R|, . . . , k}. We set d(r) = k + |R| for every resource r /∈ X ∪ Y
and d(r) = 1 for every resource r ∈ (X ∪ Y ) \ {a, b, c}. First of all, observe that in the first case the delay of Y equals
d(a) + |Y | − 1 < k + |R| and that in the second case the delay of X equals d(a) + |X | − 1 < k + |R|. Hence, a set Z ∈ Σ
that contains a resource r /∈ X ∪ Y can never have minimum delay as its delay is at least k+|R|. Thus, only sets Z ∈ Σ with
Z ⊆ X ∪ Y can have minimum delay. Since for such sets, a /∈ Z implies b, c ∈ Z , we know that every set with minimum
delay must contain a or it must contain b and c .
Consider the case d(a) + |R| ≤ d(b) + d(c) and assume for contradiction that there exists an optimal set Z∗ with
a /∈ Z∗. Due to the choice of a, b, and c , the set Z∗ must then contain b and c. Hence d(Z∗) ≥ d(b) + d(c). Furthermore,
again due to the choice of a, b, and c , there exists a set Z ′ ⊆ X ∪ Y with a ∈ Z ′ and b, c /∈ Z ′. The delay of Z ′ is
d(Z ′) = d(a) + |Z ′| − 1 < d(a) + |R| ≤ d(b) + d(c) ≤ d(Z∗), contradicting the assumption that Z∗ has minimum delay.
Hence every optimal set Z∗ must contain a. If Z∗ additionally contains b or c , then its delay is at least d(a) + |R| > d(Z ′).
Hence, in the case d(a)+ |R| ≤ d(b)+ d(c) every optimal set Z∗ contains a but it does not contain b and c .
Consider the case d(a) ≥ d(b)+ d(c)+ |R| and assume for contradiction that there exists an optimal set Z∗ with b /∈ Z∗
or c /∈ Z∗. Then Z∗ must contain a and hence its delay is at least d(a). Due to the choice of a, b, and c , there exists a set
Z ′ ⊆ X ∪ Y with a /∈ Z ′ and b, c ∈ Z ′. The delay of Z ′ is d(Z ′) = d(b)+ d(c)+ |Z ′| − 2 < d(b)+ d(c)+ |R| ≤ d(a) ≤ d(Z∗),
contradicting the assumption that Z∗ hasminimumdelay. Hence every optimal set Z∗must contain b and c . If Z∗ additionally
contains a, then its delay is at least d(b)+ d(c)+ |R| > d(Z ′). Hence, in the case d(a) ≥ d(b)+ d(c)+ |R| every optimal
set Z∗ contains b and c but it does not contain a. 
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4.2. The matroid property is maximal for guaranteeing the existence of equilibria
We are now ready to prove that Theorems 3 and 13 cannot be extended further without placing additional assumptions
on the delay functions and/or the relation of the strategy spaces. We first consider weighted congestion games.
Theorem 18. For every non-matroid anti-chainΣ on a set of resourcesR there exists a weighted congestion game Γ with two
players whose strategy spaces are isomorphic toΣ that does not possess a Nash equilibrium. The delay functions in Γ are positive
and increasing.
Proof. Given a non-matroid anti-chainwe describe how to construct aweighted congestion gamewith the properties stated
in the theorem. We first describe how the strategy spaces are defined and then how the delay functions are chosen.
Let Σ1 and Σ2 be two set systems on sets of resources R1 and R2, respectively. In the following we assume that both
sets are isomorphic to Σ and that Σi is the strategy space of player i, for i = 1, 2. Due to the (1, 2)-exchange property we
can, for every player i, identify three distinct resources ai, bi, ci ∈ Ri with the properties as in Definition 15. Since we have
not made any assumption on the global structure of the game, we can arbitrarily decide which resources fromR1 andR2
coincide. The resourcesRi \ {ai, bi, ci} are exclusively used by player i. Hence, we can assume that their delays are chosen
such that the (1, 2)-exchange property is satisfied. Thus, to simplify matters we can assume that
Σ1 = {{a1}︸︷︷︸
S11
, {b1, c1}︸ ︷︷ ︸
S21
} and Σ2 = {{a2}︸︷︷︸
S12
, {b2, c2}︸ ︷︷ ︸
S22
}.
In the following, we assume that a1 = b2, b1 = a2 and c1 = c2. Thus we can rewrite the strategy spaces as follows:
Σ1 = {{x}, {y, z}} andΣ2 = {{y}, {x, z}}.
We set ω1 = 2 and ω2 = 1 and define the following increasing delay functions for the resources x, y and z, where
m = |R|:
nr = 1 nr = 2 nr = 3
dx(nx) m 20 ·m 21 ·m
dy(ny) 5 ·m 12 ·m 15 ·m
dz(nz) 3 ·m 4 ·m 10 ·m
One can easily verify that |δi(S ⊕ S1i ) − δi(S ⊕ S2i )| ≥ m, for i = 1, 2, regardless of the choice of the other player. Hence,
for every player, one of the inequalities in Definition 15 is always satisfied. This game does not possess a Nash equilibrium
since player 1 prefers to play strategy S21 if player 2 plays strategy S
1
2 , and S
1
1 if player 2 plays strategy S
2
2 . Additionally, player
2 prefers to play strategy S22 if player 1 plays strategy S
2
1 , and S
1
2 if player 1 plays strategy S
1
1 . 
Theorem 19. For every non-matroid anti-chainΣ on a set of resourcesR there exists a player-specific congestion game Γ with
two players whose strategy spaces are isomorphic to Σ that does not possess a Nash equilibrium. The delay functions in Γ are
positive and increasing.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 18. In particular, the construction of the strategy spaces of the players is
identical. The player-specific delay functions are obtained from the delay functions in the proof of Theorem 18 as follows:
For the first player d1r (nr) = dr(nr + 1), for every resource r ∈ {x, y, z} and every congestion nr ∈ {1, 2}. For the second
player d2r (1) = dr(1) and d2r (2) = dr(3), for every resource r ∈ {x, y, z}. 
Summarizing, every non-matroid anti-chain can be used to construct a player-specific or weighted congestion game
with positive delay functions that does not possess a Nash equilibrium. Observe that this result also holds if the system
is not an anti-chain but the pruned set system, i.e., the set system obtained after removing all supersets, is not the set of
bases of a matroid. This is because supersets cannot occur in a Nash equilibrium in the case of positive delay functions.
Correspondingly, our results presented in Theorems 3 and 13 show that a player-specific or weighted congestion game in
which all pruned strategy spaces correspond to bases of matroids possesses a Nash equilibrium with respect to the pruned
and, hence, alsowith respect to the original strategy spaces because supersets areweakly dominated by subsets in the case of
non-negative delay functions. Thus, the matroid property (applied to the pruned strategy spaces) is necessary and sufficient
to show the existence of Nash equilibria.
Corollary 20. The matroid property is the maximal property on the pruned strategy spaces of the individual players that
guarantees the existence of Nash equilibria in weighted and player-specific congestion games with non-negative, non-decreasing
delay functions.
4.3. A comment on network congestion games
Our negative results in Theorems 18 and 19 assume that it is possible to interweave the strategy spaces of the players in
a specific manner. A legitimate question is whether our construction can nevertheless be embedded into natural classes of
congestion games in which the resources have a common combinatorial interpretation.
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Fig. 1. An example of a network congestion game with the strategy spaces as defined in the proofs of Theorems 18 and 19.
Here, we demonstrate that our construction can, for instance, easily be embedded into network congestion games.
However, note that we are not the first to present player-specific or weighted network congestion games which do not
possess Nash equilibria [8,17].
Consider the network depicted in Fig. 1. The first player likes to route her traffic from s1 to t1 and the second player from
s2 to t2. Observe that the sets of paths of player 1 and 2 coincide with the strategy spaces as defined above. We conclude the
following corollary.
Corollary 21. There exist instances of player-specific and instances of weighted network congestion games with non-decreasing
delay functions which do not possess Nash equilibria.
Observe, that the players are not symmetric, i.e., they like to connect the source to different sinks. However, it is not
difficult to make the game symmetric by introducing a common sink t which is connected to t1 and t2 and by appropriately
defining the delay functions of the edges {t1, t} and {t2, t}.
5. Convergence time in weighted matroid congestion games
In Section 3 we have shown that players playing lazy best responses eventually reach a Nash equilibrium in every
weighted matroid congestion game. In weighted singleton congestion games every best response is a lazy best response,
hence, in these games every sequence of best responses leads to a Nash equilibrium. It is an interesting question how
many best responses are actually needed to find a Nash equilibrium. This question is addressed by Even-Dar et al. [5]
who present a family of weighted singleton congestion games with symmetric players and identical resources with best
response sequences of exponential length. However, they use exponentially large weights in their construction. In this
section, we present an infinite family of weighted singleton congestion games possessing superpolynomially long best
response sequences although every player has either weight one or n and all delays are polynomially bounded in the
number of players and resources. This immediately implies that players do not necessarily reach a Nash equilibrium in
pseudopolynomial time in a weighted singleton congestion game.
Theorem 22. There exists a constant c > 0 such that for every n ∈ N, there exists a weighted singleton congestion game Γ with
at most cn2 players and at most cn resources that possesses a best response sequence of length 2n. The players in Γ have either
weight 1 or weight n, and the maximum delay is upper bounded by cn3.
From Theorem 22 we can conclude the following corollary.
Corollary 23. Weighted matroid congestion games do not converge to a Nash equilibrium in pseudopolynomial time.
Proof (Theorem 22). A well known technique for constructing instances of local search problems with exponentially long
best response sequences is to construct instances that resemble the behavior of a binary counter (see, e. g., [1,3,13,18]). We
apply this technique to weighted singleton congestion games.
Let n ∈ N be chosen arbitrarily. We construct a weighted singleton congestion game with O(n2) players and O(n)
resources that resembles the behavior of a binary counter counting from 0 to 2n − 1. The instance consists of n gadgets
G0, . . . ,Gn−1 where gadget Gi represents the ith bit of the counter; G0 represents the least significant bit, Gn−1 the most
significant bit. For every gadget Gi, we define three main configurations, namely a 0-state, a 1-state and a reset state, with
the following properties.
(1) If gadget Gi is in its 0-state and no gadget Gj with j > i is in its reset state, then there exists a best response sequence of
gadget Gi such that Gi first changes to its reset state and then to its 1-state.
(2) If gadget Gi is in its 1-state and at least one gadget Gj with j > i is in its reset state, then there exists a best response
sequence of gadget Gi such that Gi changes to its 0-state.
One can easily verify that these two properties ensure that there exists a best response sequence of all gadgets that
resembles a binary counter counting from 0 to 2n − 1: Initially all gadgets are in their 0-state. First gadget G0 changes to its
1-state, then gadget G1. However, when gadget G1 changes to its 1-state it passes its reset state, and therefore resets gadget
G0. Afterwards gadget G0 may change back to its 1-state. We proceed with gadget G2 that resets the gadgets G0 and G1 by
changing to its 1-state. We may continue with gadget G0 and so on.
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Fig. 2. Illustration of gadget Gi . Nodes represent resources, edges represent players.
Now we describe the gadgets G0, . . . ,Gn−1 in detail. Gadget Gi consists of i + 2 players and 3 resources r i1, r i2 and r i3.
There are two main players, the bit player and the reset player, and i additional players, which we call connection players.
The bit player and the reset player both have weight n, and each connection player has weight 1. Later, we will define delay
functions and strategy spaces such that the best responses of the connection players are uniquely determined by the choice
of the reset player. The purpose of the connection players is to propagate the decision of the reset player to the gadgets
G0, . . . ,Gi−1. The delay functions of the resources are defined as follows.
dr i1(nr i1) =
{
3(n− i+ 1)+ 1 if nr i1 ≤ 2n− i− 2
3n2(i+ 1)+ 2 otherwise
dr i2(nr i2) =
{
3(n− i+ 1)+ 2 if nr i2 ≤ n
3n2(i+ 1)+ 1 otherwise
dr i3(nr i3) =
{
3(n− i+ 1)+ 3 if nr i3 ≤ i
3n2(i+ 1) otherwise.
We denote by Σ iBit and Σ
i




of the jth connection player, with 0 ≤ j ≤ i− 1. Let the strategy spaces be defined as
Σ iBit = {{r i1}, {r i2}} Σ iReset = {{r i3}, {r i2}} Σ iConj = {{r j1}, {r i3}}.
For every player, we call the first strategy according to the above given ordering, her 0-strategy and the second one her
1-strategy. Fig. 2 illustrates our construction.
In the following, we describe the state of gadget Gi by a pair of bits (x, y), meaning that the bit player plays her x-strategy
and that the reset player plays her y-strategy. When describing the state of a gadget by such a pair, we assume that the
connection players have played their best responses according to strategy y. We denote by (0, 0) the 0-state of gadget Gi, by
(1, 0) the 1-state, and by (0, 1) the reset state. We can then formulate the aforementioned properties of gadget Gi in terms
of sequences of states (x, y).
(1) If gadget Gi is in state (0, 0) and every gadget Gj with j > i is in state (0, 0) or (1, 0), then there exists a best response
sequence of gadget Gi such that Gi first changes to its reset state (0,1) and then to the state (1, 0).
(2) If gadget Gi is in state (1, 0) and at least one gadget Gj with j > i is in state (0,1), then there exists a best response
sequence of gadget Gi such that Gi changes to state (0, 0).
It remains to show that the delay functions are chosen in the right way, that is, all strategy changes are best responses.
We first show that the connection players of gadget Gi are solely controlled by the reset player of that gadget. Therefore,
consider the following two cases.
(a) If the reset player plays her 0-strategy {r i3}, then the best response for every connection player is her 0-strategy. This is
true since in this case the delay on resource r i3 equals 3n
2(i+ 1) and the maximum delay on any resource r j1 is at most
3n2(j+ 1)+ 2 which is less than 3n2(i+ 1) because j < i.
(b) If the reset player plays her 1-strategy {r i2}, then the best response for every connection player is her 1-strategy. This
is true since in this case the delay on r i3 equals 3(n − i + 1) + 3, and the minimum delay on any resource r j1 is at least
3(n− j+ 1)+ 1 which is larger than 3(n− i+ 1)+ 3 because j < i.
In the following, we assume that immediately after each strategy change of the reset player, the connection players of
the corresponding gadget change their strategies appropriately. Hence, when we say that the reset player of gadget Gi plays
her x-strategy, x ∈ {0, 1}, we implicitly assume that all connection players of that gadget play their x-strategies, too. Now
we study the aforementioned best response sequences of the bit and reset players of a gadget Gi in detail.
(1) Gadget Gi is in state (0, 0) and all reset players of the gadgets Gj with j > i play their 0-strategy. In this case, the reset
player can decrease her delay from 3n2(i+ 1) to 3(n− i+ 1)+ 2 by changing to her 1-strategy. After that, gadget Gi is
in state (0, 1), and the bit player can decrease her delay from 3n2(i+ 1)+ 2 to 3n2(i+ 1)+ 1. After that gadget Gi is in
state (1, 1), and the reset player can decrease her delay from 3n2(i+ 1)+ 1 to 3n2(i+ 1) by changing to her 0-strategy.
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After that the gadget is in state (1, 0) and as long as no reset player of a gadget Gj with j > i plays her 1-strategy it stays
in this state.
(2) Gadget Gi is in state (1, 0) and at least one reset player of a gadget Gj with j > i plays her 1-strategy. In this case, the
cumulative weight of all players allocating resource r i1 is at most n− i− 2. Hence, the bit player can decrease her delay
from (3n− i+ 1)+ 2 to (3n− i+ 1)+ 1 by changing to her 0-strategy. After that the gadget is in state (0, 0).
Altogether this shows that the aforementioned sequence of strategy changes is a best response sequence and results in
counting from 0 to 2n − 1. 
Let us briefly mention that our construction can even be implemented with players who have only weights 1 or 2.
In order to achieve this, one has to introduce additional players who propagate the decision of the reset players to the
connections players. Based on the observation that a player with weight 2 can displace two players of weight 1 from a
resource, these players can be arranged in a binary tree with i leaves that propagate the decision to the connection players.
As this construction is rather technical and does not give new insights, we do not present the details.
6. Open problems
In contrast to player-specific congestion games, the proof of Theorem 13 does not yield an efficient algorithm for
computing Nash equilibria in weighted matroid congestion games. To the best of our knowledge, efficient algorithms are
only known in the case of weighted singleton congestion games with identical resources, i.e., all resources have identical,
non-decreasing delay functions. If the players are symmetric, Fotakis et al. [7] show that it suffices to assign the players in
non-increasing order of their weights to resources with minimum delay given the choices of the previous players. In the
case of asymmetric players, Gairing et al. [9] show how to compute a Nash equilibrium in polynomial time.
We leave as an open problem whether Nash equilibria in weighted matroid congestion games can be computed
efficiently. Since the lexicographic order defined in the proof of Theorem 13 is a potential function with respect to the
lazy best response dynamics, the problem of computing an equilibrium belongs to PLS. This has already been observed by
Fabrikant et al. [6] for a generalization of weighted singleton congestion games. This implies that the problem of finding an
equilibrium cannot be NP-hard, unless NP=co-NP [15]. But it is still open whether it is PLS-complete to find an equilibrium
in such games.
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